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Abstract
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1. INTRODUCTION

The consumers of over-the-air (OTA) broadcasts value both variety and reception.
With the current technology and constrained broadcasting spectrum, an improvement
in any of these factors comes at the expense of the other. An expansion of the number
of OTA broadcasters increases programs’ variety and the heightened competition
improves programs’ contents, but the increased spectral congestion intensifies
interferences. This tradeoff is the focal theme of our analysis of the optimal control of
a spectrum allocated to OTA broadcasts. Our focus on this theme is briefly motivated
by historical and contemporary evidence from the OTA broadcasting industries in
technologically advanced countries.
Due to the public good nature of OTA broadcasts and their educational, cultural
and political impacts and due to scarce bandwidth and high sunk costs, broadcasts and
entry rules have been tightly regulated in all major OECD countries (cf., Webbink
1973). Until the late 1970s the television broadcasting industries in OECD countries
comprised only a handful of licensed and highly protected public and commercial
firms. Since the 1980s alternative transmission techniques, such as satellite and cable,
have created a more favorable environment for entry into the television broadcasting
industry. Yet veteran incumbent OTA broadcasters’ focus on nation-wide audience
and their market shares have remained very high (cf., Motta and Polo, 1997; Caves,
2006). The radio broadcasting industries have been less concentrated and more
localized, but also entry to these industries has remained highly regulated due to sunk
costs and tight spectrum constraint. In many European metropolitan areas, OTA radio
broadcasting includes 20 to 80 FM stations and similar numbers of AM stations.
Metropolitan areas in Italy offer the largest FM variety. With only 50 kHz separation
between stations, they have the most heavily congested FM broadcasting spectrum in
Europe.
Congestion generates interferences. The intensified tradeoff between variety and
reception has been recently stressed by the Electronic Communication Committee
(ECC) within the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications
Administrations (CEPT, 2010).1 The recent adoption of digital transmission
1

"The available [FM] spectrum (20.5 MHz) constitutes a limited resource that is used intensively in
Europe. In many countries the introduction of new FM services is difficult and may lead to an
unacceptable degradation of existing services." (CEPT, 2010, Section 1, P. 5) … "The FM spectrum is
in many areas overcrowded and may be reaching saturation if the high quality of reception and existing
coverages must be retained. This results in FM services increasingly being interference-limited by
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technologies has expanded the scope for program variety in both the television and
radio broadcasting industries. Digital technology is spectral efficient — it can increase
the number of channels six-fold (cf., Adda and Ottaviani, 2005). The adoption of
digital technology by American OTA broadcasters in 2007 and the subsequent turning
off of analogue signals in 2008 have freed a significant UHF space. However, the
spectral gains have not relaxed the US television broadcasting industry’s spectrum
constraint. The spectral dividend of the digital switchover was mainly auctioned off to
large telecommunications carriers in order to accommodate the deployment of 4G
mobile-phone networks. Similar diversion of the digital switchover’s spectral
dividend is expected in the rest of the OECD countries. The situation is more complex
for radio broadcasting as only few countries have successfully adopted and rolled out
digital platforms for radio transmissions, and even fewer have clear digital switchover
plans for analogue radio broadcasting. Still, buffer zones between broadcasters’ bands
have to be reduced in order to accommodate new entrants to the OTA broadcasting
industry.
Despite the digital switchover, expansion of the OTA broadcasting industry can be
expected to intensify the tradeoff between variety and reception in the pursuit of the
overall quality of programs. The variety-reception tradeoff is likely to be most
prominent under a deregulatory scheme that allows free entry and exit. In view of the
recent broadcasting spectrum deregulatory trends (cf., De Vany, 1998; Hazlett, 2008)
and the variety-reception tradeoff, our theoretical analysis explores the optimal
steady-state number of OTA broadcasters and its stability when entry and exit are
motivated by above-normal profits and moderated by sunk costs. We treat the
broadcasting spectrum as a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. As in
the case of any other state-owned natural resource, governments are entitled to
royalties on its use. Hence, in addition to the direct benefits from the service provided
by the broadcasting industry, there are indirect benefits—the public services financed
by the states’ royalties on this natural resource.
We construct a conceptual framework where the state’s royalties are allowed to
vary over time so as to maximize the sum of the discounted direct and indirect
benefits stemming from the use of the broadcasting spectrum. The number of
broadcasters is allowed to adjust to the above-normal profit from broadcasting at a
design or otherwise and these higher interference levels may have to be accepted to allow the
introduction of many more additional services". (CEPT, 2010, Section 2, P. 5)
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rate moderated by sunk costs. The broadcasting industry’s above-normal profit is
assumed to rise with the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service. On the one
hand, entry increases variety, heightens competition and, in turn, raises the quality of
the industry’s service. On the other hand, entry increases spectral congestion and the
intensified interferences lower the quality of the industry’s service.
The possible sensitivity of the consumers’ incomes to the quality of the industry’s
service is another central theme in our analysis. In constructing the optimal control
model, we take into account two opposing effects of the quality of the service on the
consumers’ incomes. On the one hand, the information disseminated by the
broadcasts enhances knowledge, forms standards of performance and generates
transactions. On the other hand, broadcasts divert time from work and other modes of
investment in human and social capitals. The higher the overall quality of the
industry’s broadcasts (variety and reception) is, the stronger these opposing effects.
The net effect of the quality of the industry’s service on the consumers’ aggregate
income is not clear.
We derive the steady state of the royalties-based optimally controlled industry,
present its comparative statics and identify the conditions that allow for a stable path
to the optimal steady state along which the number of broadcasters gradually
converges to the optimal steady state. In contrast to the observed consolidation and
return to concentration in the aftermath of deregulatory reforms in the United States,
Italy, Germany and Japan (cf., Noam, 1992; Motta and Polo, 1997; Hazlet, 2005), our
analysis of royalties-based optimal control of the OTA broadcasting industry reveals a
possible convergence to a steady state with a larger number of broadcasters.
To set the stage and motivate the royalties-based optimal control of the OTA
broadcasting industry, Section 2 presents the industry’s basic dynamics and Section 3
computes and illustrates the industry’s steady state under ad hoc fixed royalties and
adjustment to above-normal profits. Section 4 formalizes the multifaceted effects of
broadcasts on the consumers’ utility: a quality enhanced positive direct effect, a
negative indirect effect of diverting budget from other, private, goods, the
aforementioned opposing effects of the quality of the broadcasting industry’s service
on the consumers’ aggregate income and budget, and the positive effect of the
spectrum royalties on the provision of public goods. Section 4 assembles these utility
aspects and the OTA broadcasting industry’s dynamics described in Section 2 into the
construction of the social planner’s optimal control problem. Section 5 derives the
4

optimal steady-state number of the OTA broadcasters and its comparative statics.
Section 6 analyzes the possibility of convergence to the industry’s optimal steady
state.

2. DYNAMICS OF THE INDUSTRY

Let n(t) denote the number of suppliers (broadcasters) of OTA transmitted programs
(broadcasts) at time t. At every instance t each broadcaster uses a single channel and
delivers a single program. Let the broadcasters be technologically and location-wise
identical and paying royalties, g(t), to the government for using a band at t. Also let
the width of each band (channel) be technologically determined and fixed, ω , and the
bands evenly spread along a fixed homogeneous spectrum space set aside for the
broadcasting industry, Ŝ . Then the buffer zones between bands evenly diminish as the
number of broadcasters increases and broadcasts are equally receivable by any
consumer. For tractability, let us further assume that the consumers are located at an
identical, physically unobstructed, distance from the broadcasters (e.g., a flat circular
area with broadcasters at its centre and residents in its circumference). Then all
broadcasts are equally receivable by all. In our setting, the programs’ consumers are
also users of broadcast time. Namely, they advertise their services during programs.
Broadcasters enter (exit) the industry as long as the above-normal profit (ANP)
from broadcasting is positive (negative). That is,

 = φANP(t) ,
n(t)

(1)

where φ > 0 reflects the speed of adjustment (ease of entry and exit). Sunk costs
deter entry and exit. The larger the broadcasters’ sunk costs are, the lower the speed
of adjustment of the number of broadcasters to the above-normal profit from
broadcasting. The sunk costs are assumed to be time-invariant and hence φ is taken to
be a scalar. With Ŝ denoting the spectrum available to the broadcasting industry,

0 ≤ n(t) ≤ Sˆ / ω .
From the perspective of the consumers, the overall quality of the aerially
transmitted programs, Q(t), rises with variety, depth and reception. While the variety
and depth of programs rise with the number of channels and their competition,
interferences intensify as the buffer zone between the channels diminishes. In other
words, reception is positively related to the size of the unused spectrum (S), which is
given by:

5

S(t) = Sˆ − ωn(t) .

(2)

Consequently,

Q(t) = q(n(t),S(t)) = q(n(t), (Sˆ − ωn(t))) ,

(3)

ˆ = 0 . The direct, variety, effect of the number of channels on quality, is
where, q(0,S)
positive but not increasing: q n > 0 and q nn ≤ 0 . The indirect effect of the number of
channels on quality, through deteriorating reception, is negative: −ωqs , where qs > 0
and (for simplicity) unchanged, qss = 0 . Up to a critical number of channels, n
( n < Sˆ / ω ), the positive variety effect dominates the negative interference effect:
>

<

<

>

Q n = (q n − ωq s ) = 0 for n = n .

The overall demand for broadcasts increases with quality. Consequently, the
broadcasting industry’s aggregate revenue from advertisements and subscription fees
at any t is R(Q(t)) with R(0) = 0 , R Q > 0 and, for tractability, R QQ = 0 . Assuming
that the consumers do not have favourite channels, the industry’s aggregate revenue is
equally distributed. The instantaneous operational cost of each channel is, for
simplicity, time-invariant, c, and so also is the (foregone) normal profit attainable in
other industries, π .
In sum, the change in the number of broadcasters (channels) is given by:
 = φ{[R(q(n(t), (Sˆ − ωn(t)))) / n(t)] − [c + π + g(t)]} .
n(t)

(4)

The royalties charged on bands reduce the above-normal profit and, subsequently, the
number of broadcasters. In turn, the variety and depth of programs is reduced, but the
reception of each broadcast is improved. If the former (latter) effect dominates the
latter (former), the industry’s overall revenue decreases (increases), the number of
broadcasters is diminished (increased), and so forth. As long as the broadcasting
industry is not in the optimal steady state, time-invariant royalties are not optimal. In
the following sections we firstly demonstrate the role of fixed ad hoc royalties in the
said process and then the determination of the optimal royalties.

3. STEADY STATE OF THE INDUSTRY UNDER FIXED AD HOC ROYALTIES

Recalling our assumptions, R(0) = 0 and the slope of the industry’s revenue curve is
>
<
dR
= R Q (q n − ωqs ) = 0 for n = n
<
>
dn

(5)
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as depicted in Figure 1 by the inverted parabola. With fixed royalties, g 0 , the
industry’s cost function is linear in n, C(t) = (c + π + g 0 )n(t) . The interior steady state
of the industry is in the intersection between the industry’s revenue curve and cost
line, which, as displayed by the arrows along the horizontal axis, is asymptotically
stable. The larger the speed of adjustment is, the faster the convergence of the number
of OTA broadcasters to the steady state number, n ss . In the extreme case of φ → ∞ ,
adjustment to steady state is immediate. Namely, n(t) = n ss at any t as the immediate
adjustment of the broadcasters’ number exhausts the broadcasting industry’s above
normal profit:
ANP(t) = R(q(n ss , (Sˆ − ωn ss ))) / n ss − (c + π + g 0 ) = 0 ∀t .

(6)

High sunk costs and strict regulations diminish the speed of adjustment. In the polar
extreme case of no-adjustment ( φ = 0 ), the number of OTA broadcasters is time
invariant, n NA , and the above normal profit is a scalar, Δ , which can be positive,
negative or zero. In this case,
R(q(n NA , (Sˆ − ωn NA ))) − (c + π + g 0 + Δ )n NA = 0 .

(7)

If, by fluke, Δ = 0 , the number of OTA broadcasters under no-adjustment is identical
to the aforementioned steady-state number of OTA broadcasters.
To illustrate the difference in the number of OTA broadcasters under the said two
polar cases, we consider some computationally convenient specifications. In
particular, we specify the overall quality of the service of the OTA broadcasting
industry for the consumers to be given by
Q(t) = n(t)[Sˆ − ωn(t)]

(8)

where, as indicated by Eq. (2), Ŝ − ωn is the size of the unused spectrum set aside for
broadcasting. This parabolic specification of Q reflects properties that can be resulted
>

<

<

>

from the opposite effects of n on variety and reception: Q n = Sˆ − 2ωn = 0 as n = Sˆ / 2ω
and Q nn = −2ω < 0 . Namely, the marginal effect of the number of OTA broadcasters
on the overall quality of the service of the OTA broadcasting industry is initially
positive but diminishing, and when the number of OTA broadcasters is larger than
Ŝ / 2ω the positive effect of n on variety is dominated by the negative effect of

congestion on reception.
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We assume that the marginal revenue (i.e., increment in revenues from
subscription fees and commercial advertisements) from the quality of the broadcasting
industry service is constant (p) and, for simplicity, also time-invariant. That is, p can
be interpreted as the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality. In which case, the OTA
broadcasting industry revenue function is
R(t) = pQ(t) .

(9)

By substituting the right-hand side of Eq. (8) for Q into this specification of R, the
industry’s revenue function is
ˆ
− pωn(t)2
R(t) = pSn(t)

(10)

and the industry’s above-normal profit is
ANP(t) = (pSˆ − pωn(t)) − (c + π + g) .

(11)

By setting ANP to zero, the steady-state number of OTA broadcasters is
n ss =

1 ⎡ˆ c + π + g ⎤
S−
⎥.
ω ⎢⎣
p
⎦

(12)

This steady-state number of OTA broadcasters is smaller than the number that can be
accommodated, Ŝ / ω . The smaller the broadcasting service’s mark-up [p / (c + π + g)]
is, the larger the difference between the number of broadcasters that can be
accommodated and the steady state number. By lowering the royalties per band, the
government increases the mark-up for OTA broadcasters and, in turn, their steadystate number.
By substituting (10) into (7), the number of OTA broadcasters under noadjustment ( n NA ) is
n NA =

1 ⎡ˆ c + π + g + Δ ⎤
S−
⎥.
ω ⎢⎣
p
⎦

(13)

The number of OTA broadcasters under no-adjustment with positive (negative) above
normal profit is smaller (larger) than the steady-state number of OTA broadcasters.
As displayed by Figure 1, these numbers are given by the intersection of the dashed
lines (c + π + g + Δ)n with the industry total revenue curve. As the rigidities (high
sunk costs and regulations on entry and exit) causing no-adjustment are moderated,
convergence to steady state begins. The greater the speed of adjustment is, the faster
the convergence of the number of the OTA broadcasters from n NA to n ss .

8

R
C

n( Δ > 0)

0

n

ss

n( Δ < 0)

Sˆ / ω

Figure 1. Number of broadcasters under fixed royalties

4. OPTIMAL CONTROL OF THE INDUSTRY

Let us now analyze a socially optimal determination of royalties and adjustment of
broadcasters’ number. In the proposed setting, technology is fixed, the government
allows entry and exist, yet it indirectly controls the number of broadcasters by
choosing the trajectory of royalties {g} per band that maximizes the consumers’
lifetime utility. The royalties received by the government from the broadcasters at t,

n(t)g(t) , are immediately directed to finance public services.
Consumers are infinitely lived and have an aggregate income, Y(t), of which
R(q(t)) is spent on access to, and advertisements in, the OTA broadcasts and the
remainder, Y(t)-R(q(t)), on private goods. Broadcasts have two opposing effects on
aggregate income. On the one hand, they disseminate information that enhances
knowledge, forms standards of performance and generates transactions. On the other
hand, they divert time from work and active investment in human and social capitals.
These opposing effects are intensified by the quality of the broadcasts. With ϕ1 > 0
indicating the information dissemination effect, ϕ2 > 0 the production-effort
diversion effect of broadcasts, and Ŷ > 0 the aggregate income attainable when the
said effects offset one another (or nil), the consumers’ aggregate income is:
ˆ + (ϕ − ϕ )Q(t) .
Y(t) = Y
1
2

(14)

9

With (14) and the explicit specifications (8) and (9) of the broadcasting industry’s
quality of service and revenue and with α > 0 indicating the consumers’ direct
marginal instantaneous utility from the quality of the broadcasts and β > 0 their
marginal instantaneous utility from the private goods, the consumers’ instantaneous
utilities from the quality of the broadcasts ( u1 ) and from consuming the private good
( u 2 ) are:
ˆ
− ωn(t) 2 ]
u1 (t) = α[Sn(t)

(15)

and
ˆ
ˆ + (ϕ − ϕ − p)[Sn(t)
− ωn(t) 2 ]} .
u 2 (t) = β{Y
1
2

(16)

In addition, the consumers’ derive instantaneous utility ( u 3 ) from the investment
of the spectrum’s royalties, n(t)g(t), in the provision of public goods. In contrast to the
constant marginal utilities assumed in (15) and (16), diminishing marginal utility from
the spectrum’s royalties spent on the provision of the public goods, u′′3 < 0 , cannot be
compromised for analytical simplicity since g is the public planner’s control variable.
A second order polynomial that ensures a diminishing positive marginal utility from
the public goods at the steady-state financing level n*g* and reflects the consumers’
dislike of deviations from that optimal stationary contribution of the spectrum’s
royalties to the provision of public goods is considered:
u 3 (t) = γ1[n(t)g(t)] − γ 2 [n(t)g(t) − n *g*]2

(17)

where γ1 > γ 2 > 0 .2
With the time index omitted for compactness, the consumers’ overall instantaneous
utility is:3

2

Other specifications (e.g., u 3 = γ ng, γ > 0 ) were considered. The specification indicated in (17)

facilitates the computation of the steady state.
As there is no strong interaction between public goods’ consumption and private goods’ consumption,
the assumed separability of the utilities derived from these consumptions is sensible. In justifying the
assumed separability between the utilities generated from the use of the broadcasting service and from
the rest of the private good consumption, we stress that these service and private good consumption are
aggregates and that the sign of the cross derivatives of a utility function defined on these aggregates is
not clear. Some components of the broadcasting service are substitute to some components of the
consumer’s aggregate consumption of the rest of the private goods, but complementing others. For
example, watching OTA broadcast sport competitions complements the use of some household’s
facilities and utilities and the consumption of home-made food’s ingredients, but substitutes attendance
of sport competitions, use of transportation and stadium related services and consumption of fast food.
For this reason, and for tractability, the cross derivative is assumed to be nil.
3
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u = u1 + u 2 + u 3
ˆ − ωn 2 ) + β[Y
ˆ − ωn 2 )] + γ [ng] − γ [ng − n *g*]2 .
ˆ + (ϕ − ϕ − p)(Sn
= α(Sn
1
2
1
2

(18)

The public planner’s decision-problem is postulated to be choosing the trajectory
∞

of royalties that maximizes

∫e

−ρt

u(t)dt subject to:

0

n = φ[pn(Sˆ − ωn) / n − (c + g + π)] .

(21)

The current value Hamiltonian associated with this problem is
ˆ − ωn 2 ) + γ [ng] − γ [ng − n *g*]2
ˆ + [α + β(ϕ − ϕ − p)](Sn
H = βY
1
2
1
2
+ λφ[p(Sˆ − ωn) − c − g − π].

(22)

The co-state variable, λ , reflects the public planner’s current shadow value of
broadcasts’ variety and competition. The Hamiltonian is concave in the control
variable. As long as 2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + 2 γ 2g 2 > 0 , it is also concave in the state
variable. In which case, the following Pontryagin’s maximum-principle conditions
are, by the Mangasarian (1966) theorem, sufficient:
λ = −H n + ρλ = −[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)](Sˆ − 2ωn)
− [ γ1 − 2 γ 2 (ng − n *g*)]g + (φpω + ρ)λ

(23)

H g = [ γ1 − 2 γ 2 (ng − n *g*)]n − λφ = 0

(24)

n = φ[p(Sˆ − ωn) − c − g − π]

(25)

lim e −ρt H(t) = 0 .

(26)

t →∞

By differentiating (24) with respect to time, substituting (23) for λ and (24) for λ and
rearranging terms, the Euler equation for the optimal change in royalties on bands is:
g =

φ[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)](Sˆ − 2ωn) + [ γ1 − 2 γ 2 (ng − n *g*)][φg − (φpω + ρ)n]

+

2γ 2 n 2
[ γ1 − 2 γ 2 (2ng − n *g*)]
2γ 2 n 2

.(27)

n

The change in the optimal royalties is moderated by the public planner’s rate of time
preference and the broadcasters’ marginal return on the quality of programs. The
change in the optimal royalties rises with the consumers’ marginal direct utility from
the broadcasts and with the net effect of the broadcasts on the consumers’ aggregate
income ( ϕ1 − ϕ2 ), proportionally to the product of the consumers’ marginal utility
from the private goods and the available broadcasting spectrum.
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5. INDUSTRY’S OPTIMAL STEADY STATE

From the necessary conditions (23), (24) and (25) we obtain that in steady state:
−[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)](Sˆ − 2ωn*) − γ1g * + (φpω + ρ)λ* = 0

(27)

λ* = ( γ1 / φ)n *

(28)

g* = p(Sˆ − ωn*) − c − π .

(29)

By substituting (28) and (29) into (27) the steady-state number of broadcasters is:

n* =

[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]Sˆ
.
2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]

(30)

Corollary 1. The steady-state number of broadcasters rises with the consumers’

marginal direct utility from broadcasts.
Proof:

γ1 (ρ / φ)Sˆ
∂n *
=
> 0.
∂α {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2

Corollary 2. If the broadcasts’ information-dissemination effect on the consumers’

aggregate income ( ϕ1 ) dominates (is dominated by) the sum of the production-effortdiversion effect ( ϕ2 ) and the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality (p), then the
steady-state number of broadcasters increases (decreases) with the consumers’
marginal utility from the other private goods.
Proof:

>
>
γ1 (ρ / φ)(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)Sˆ
∂n *
as
(
ϕ
−
ϕ
−
p)
=
0.
=
=
0
1
2
<
∂β {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2 <

Corollary 3. If the broadcasts’ information-dissemination effect on the consumers’

aggregate income dominates (is dominated by) the sum of the production-effortdiversion effect and the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality, then the steady-state
number of broadcasters decreases (increases) with the consumers’ marginal utility
from the public goods financed by the spectrum royalties:
Proof:

>
<
−(ρ / φ)[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]Sˆ
∂n *
as
(
ϕ
−
ϕ
−
p)
=
0.
=
=
0
1
2
<
∂γ1 {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2 >

Corollary 4. The steady-state number of broadcasters rises with the broadcasts’

information-dissemination effect on the consumers’ aggregate income.
Proof:

βγ1 (ρ / φ)Sˆ
∂n *
=
> 0.
∂ϕ1 {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2
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Corollary 5. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the

broadcasts’ production-effort-diversion effect on the consumers’ aggregate income.
Proof:

−βγ1 (ρ / φ)Sˆ
∂n *
=
< 0.
∂ϕ2 {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2

Corollary 6. If the public planner’s rate of time preference is larger (smaller) than

2ωφ[ϕ2 + (1 − γ1 )p − α − βϕ1 ] / β , then the steady-state number of broadcasters
decreases (increases) with the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality.
Proof:

∂n * −γ1{β(ρ / φ) + 2ω[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]}Sˆ <
=
=0
∂p
{2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2 >
>

as β(ρ / φ) + 2ω[α + βϕ1 + γ1p] = 2ω(ϕ2 + p) , which by rearrangement can be displayed
<

>

as ρ = 2ωφ[ϕ2 + (1 − γ1 )p − α − βϕ1 ] / β .
<

Corollary 7. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the band’s

width:
−2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]2 Sˆ
∂n *
=
<0
∂ω {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2

Corollary 8. If the consumers’ price of broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than

[β(ϕ2 + p − ϕ1 ) − α] / γ1 (the consumers’ net loss of utility from private consumption
due to a marginal improvement in the broadcasts’ quality, deflated by the consumers’
marginal utility from the spectrum’s royalties), then the steady-state number of
broadcasters decreases (increases) with the public planner’s rate of time preferences.
Proof:

<
−( γ1 / φ)[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]Sˆ
∂n *
=
=
0
∂ρ {2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2 >
>

α + βϕ1 + γ1p =β(ϕ2 + p) , which by rearrangement can be displayed as

as

<

>

p =[β(ϕ2 + p − ϕ1 ) − α] / γ1 . The
<

Corollary 9. If the marginal revenue from the broadcasts’ quality is larger

(smaller) than [β(ϕ2 + p − ϕ1 ) − α] / γ1 , then the steady-state number of broadcasters
increases (decreases) with the speed of adjustment to the broadcast industry’s above
normal profit.
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Proof:

>
γ1ρ[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]Sˆ
∂n *
0
=
=
∂φ {2φ[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]}2 <
>

α + βϕ1 + γ1p =β(ϕ2 + p) , which by rearrangement can be displayed as

as

<

>

p =[β(ϕ2 + p − ϕ1 ) − α] / γ1 .
<

Recalling that entry and exist are deterred by sunk costs, the steady-state number of
broadcasters decreases (increases) with the broadcasters’ sunk costs if the consumers’
price of broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than the consumers’ net loss of utility
from private consumption due to a marginal improvement in the broadcasts’ quality,
deflated by the consumers’ marginal utility from the public goods financed by the
spectrum’s royalties.
Corollary 10. The steady-state number of broadcasters decreases with the size of

the spectrum allocated to broadcasting, but otherwise decreases, if the difference
between the information-dissemination effect and the production-effort-diversion
effect on the consumers’ aggregate income satisfies the following inequality:

⎛α
⎛α
1
0.5ρ ⎞
1
0.5ρ ⎞
p − max{(α+ γ1p), ⎜ + γ1p +
⎟} < (ϕ1 −ϕ2 ) < p − min{(α+ γ1p), ⎜ + γ1p +
⎟} .
β
φω ⎠
β
φω ⎠
⎝ω
⎝ω
Proof:

[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) + γ1p]
∂n *
=
.
ˆ
∂S 2[α + β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p)]ω + γ1[2pω + ρ / φ]

The

numerator

and

denominator have the same sign only when the said inequality is satisfied.
From equation (29), the directions of the effects of the model parameters on the
steady-state royalties on bands (g*) are opposite to those on the steady-state number
of broadcasters.
6. STABILITY OF THE OPTIMAL STEADY STATE

For assessing the stability of the steady state (n*,g*) we evaluate the Jacobian of the
differential equation system (25) and (27) in steady state
−φ
⎤
⎡n *n n *g ⎤ ⎡−φpω
⎢
⎥
⎢
⎥ = 2ωφ[γ2g *(2pn * −g * /ω) − α −β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) − γ1p] + (2γ2g *n * −γ1 )ρ
⎢
⎥
*
*
{
φ
[p
ω−
g
*
/n*]
+
ρ
}
⎢g n g g ⎥
3
⎣
⎦ ⎣⎢
γ 2n *
⎦⎥
(31)

and its eigenvalues
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(

)

μ1,2 = 0.5[ρ − φ(g * /n*)] ± 0.5 [ρ − φ(g * /n*)]2 − 4φ g *n − φpω[(pω − g * /n*) + ρ] . (32)
An inspection of equation (32) suggests that if the public planner’s rate of time
preference and the broadcasters’ sunk costs are sufficiently high, the Jacobian’s trace
in steady state, [ρ − φ(g * /n*)] , might be positive. In which case, the steady state is
not asymptotically stable. This argument is based on dominant direct effects of the
public planner’s rate of time preference and the broadcasters’ sunk costs on
[ρ − φ(g * /n*)] . Their indirect effects on [ρ − φ(g * /n*)] through g * /n * are not clear.
From equation (29), g * /n* = [(pSˆ − c − π) / n*] − pω. Recalling corollaries 8 and 9,
[(pSˆ − c − π) / n*] − pω increases (decreases) with the public planner’s rate of time
preference, but decreases (increases) with the broadcasters’ sunk costs, if the marginal
revenue from the broadcasts’ quality is larger (smaller) than [β(ϕ2 + p − ϕ1 ) − α] / γ1 .
Yet even with ρ − φ(g * /n*) > 0 , there can be convergence to steady state if
Ω ≡ g *n − φpω[(pω − g * /n*) + ρ] < 0 . In this case, μ1 > 0 and μ 2 < 0 and the steady

state is a saddle point. By appropriate setting of the royalties, the public planner can
let the broadcasting industry gradually approach the steady state along the initially
nearest arm of the single stable manifold. This case is illustrated by Figure 2. While it
is clear that the slope of the isoclines n = 0 is negative (−pω) , the slope of the
isoclines g = 0 is not clear:
dg
2ωφ[ γ 2g *(2pn * −g * / ω) − α − β(ϕ1 − ϕ2 − p) − γ1p] + (2γ 2g *n * −γ1 )ρ
. (33)
(g = 0) = −
dn
γ 2 n *3 {φ[pω − g * /n*] + ρ}

As can be seen from this expression, with ρ being large the positive slope of the
isoclines n = 0 portrayed in Figure 2 is supported by a large marginal utility from the
public good in steady state: γ1 > 2γ 2 g * n * . A positive slope is also supported by a
large direct marginal utility from the quality of the broadcast ( α ) and an informationdissemination effect that dominates the effort-diversion effect of broadcasts on the
consumers’ aggregate income ( ϕ1 > ϕ2 ). Starting from a highly regulated industry
with a small number of broadcasters ( n 0 ), the left upward sloped converging arm is
relevant for the public planner. Along this arm the number of broadcasters increases
gradually despite the rising royalties.
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n = 0

g

g = 0

g*

n0

0

n*

Ŝ / ω

Figure 2. An unstable steady state — a saddle point

In contrast, if the public planner’s rate of time preference and the broadcasters’
sunk

costs

are

sufficiently

low

so

that

ρ − φ(g * /n*) < 0 ,

and

if

Ω ≡ g *n − φpω[(pω − g * /n*) + ρ] > 0 , then the steady state (n*,g*) is asymptotically

stable. If, in addition, [ρ − φ(g * /n*)]2 < 04φΩ , the steady state is note a node and the
industry’s optimal trajectory to the steady state is characterised by damped
oscillations of the number of broadcasters and royalties, as displayed in Figure 3.

g = 0

g

g*

n = 0
0

n0

n*

Ŝ / ω

Figure 3. A stable steady state approached along a spiral
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7. CONCLUSION

The advent of digital transmission technologies has done little to relieve constraints
on the amount of spectrum allocated to the broadcasting industry. The perennial
tradeoff between variety and reception still prevails. This tradeoff is likely to be most
prominent under a deregulatory scheme. Spectrum is a state-owned, time-invariant,
scarce natural resource. As in the case of any other state-owned natural resource,
governments are entitled to charge royalties on its use and can direct these revenues to
finance public services. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits from the service
provided by the broadcasting industry, the indirect benefits to consumers from the
public services financed by the royalties on this natural resource were taken into
account in the determination of the socially optimal allocation of bands to
broadcasters. For setting the state’s royalties on spectrum, we proposed an optimal
control model that takes into account the aforesaid aspects, entry and exit of
broadcasters in accordance with above-normal profit and at a rate moderated by sunk
costs, and a possible positive and negative effects of broadcasts on consumers’
income. We derived the socially optimal steady-state of the broadcasting industry and
its comparative statics and analyzed the possibility of convergence to this steady state.
In contrast to the observed consolidation and return to concentration in the aftermath
of deregulatory reforms in the United States, Italy, Germany and Japan, our analysis
reveals that optimal control of the broadcasting industry with variable royalties on
bands can gradually lead the industry to a steady state with a larger number of
broadcasters. Extensions of the analysis may consider the alternative usages of the
spectrum and determine the optimal portion of the spectrum allocated to OTA
broadcasts and the optimal band-width.
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